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ACTION EA-19

INFO NSCE-00 CIAE-00 SSO-00 DODE-00 USIE-00 NSAE-00 SP-02 SS-35

GPM-03 SC-01 NSC-10 RSC-01 P-04 INR-07 SAH-03 SAL-01 AID-30 H-02

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P R 120150Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 4205
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 2497
AMCONSUL DANANG 941

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 SAIGON 5649

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

SUBJECT: ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION OUTCOME:
III CORPS (MINUS SAIGON)

1. III CORPS (MINUS SAIGON) WITH 1,018,219 BALLOTS OR 22 PERCENT OF NATIONAL VOTE, GAVE THIEU 37 PERCENT AND DZU 22 PERCENT. THIEU THUS GAINED ABOUT SAME PERCENTAGE AS HE DINNATIONWIDE, WHILE DZU DID CONSIDERABLY BETER THAN HIS 17 PERCENT NATIONAL SHOWING. HUONG WITH 12 PERCENT ALSO SCORED BETTER IN III CORDS THAN ELESEWHERE. PHAN KHAC SUU DID POORLY, COLLECTING ONLY 7 PERCENT OF THE III CORPS VOTE.

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REMAINING SEVEN CANDIDATES CLAIMED 22 PERCENT OF CORPS VOTE WHILE AMASSING 27 PERCENT NATIONWIDE.

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2. STRIKING CONTRAST EVIDENT IN PREFERENCE OF III CORPS URBAN AND RURAL VOTERS. NORTHERN CATHOLICS ARE EXCEPTION: BOTH URBAN AND RURAL, THEY VOTED SOLIDLY FOR THIEU AND FOR CATHOLIC UPPER HOUSE LISTS. DEFINING AS "URBAN" THE GIA INH SUBURBS OF SAIGON, VUNG TAU CITY, FIVE VILLAGES IN BIEN HOA AND MOST PROVINCECAPTIALS, THIEU OUTPOLLED BZU IN THESE AREAS BY AT LEAST 4 TO 1. ELSEWHER, NON-CATHOLIC RURAL AREAS GIAVE DZU A GOOD EDGE OVER THIEU. RELATIVELY INSECURE NAU NGHIA WENT FOR DZU BY TWO TO ONE. DZU ALSO ARRIED ADJACENTWAY NINH AND BINH DUONG AND NARROWLY MISSED VICTORY IN LONG AN. IN NON-CATHOLIC URBAN AREAS, IT APPEARS THE VOTE WAS ALMOST EQUALLY SPLIT BETWEEN THIEU AND HUONG, WITH SUU AND DZU TRAILING. IN THESE NON-CATHOLIC URBAN AREAS HUONG AND SUU COLLECTED ABOUT THREE-QUARTERS OF THEIR III CORPS VOTE.

3. INITIAL FIGURES INDICATE THAT OF THE VARIOUS "BLOCS" ONLY TH NORTHERN CATHOLICS HELD FIRM AND DELIVERED EXPECTED SUPPORT TO THIEU. THE CAO DIA, MAJORITY OF WHOM BEFORE ELECTION MOST OBSERVERS BELIEVED TO BE LEANING TOWARD THE GVN SLATE,

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INSTEAD APPEAR TO HAVE VOTED HEAVILY FOR DZU. THIS INDICATES THAT PRO-GVN LEADERSHIP OF THE CAO DAI HOLY SEE IN TAY NINH HAS MUCH LESS INFLUENCE OVER RANK AND FILE THAN PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED. IN TAY NINH, DZU UPPER HOUSE LISTS 14, 15, AND 16 ALSO BESTED THE ALL VIET-NAM BLOC "COCONUT" SLATES NUMBERS 32, 33, AND 34, ALTHOUGH NOT BY MUCH. "COCONUTS" HAD SUPPORT OF CONSERVATIVE CAO DIA ELEMENTS.] MILITAR VOTE APPEARS ALSO TO HAVE BEEN SPLIT. ALTHOUGH ACCURATE STATISTICS ARE LESS EASY TO OBTAIN, AMERICANS IN BINH DUONG ESTIMATE THAT THIEU GOT NO MORE THAN FIFTY PERCENT OF THE APPROXIMATELY 12,000 VOTES CAST IN THAT PROVINCE BY ARVN FIFTH DIVISION SOLDIERS AND THEIR FAMILIES. RF AND PF VOTERS PROBABLY EXERCISED EVEN GREATER DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE. CIVIL SERVANTS APPEAR TO HAVE VOTED HEAVILY FOR HUONG AND SUU AND TO A LESSER EXTENT FOR DZU.

4. NORTHERN CATHOLICS, WHO TURNED OUT TO VOTE IN NUMBERS

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ABOUT TEN PERCENT HIGHER THAN NON-CATHOLICS, PROVIDED ANOTHE STRIKING EXAMPLE OF STRENGTH OF COHESIVE CATHOLIC COMMUNITY. FIGURES FROM SELECTED NORTHERN CATHOLIC PRECINCTS SHOW SLIGHTLY MOE THAN TWO TO ONE VOTE

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FOR THIEU, WHILE CATHOLIC (AND CATHOLIC GRETER SOLIDARITY FORCES ORGANIZATION) BASTION OF HO NAI VILLAGE IN BIEN HOA DELERED 81 PERCENT OF ITS SUBSTANTIAL VOTE TO THE TWO GENERALS. IN ONE ISOLATED CATHOLIC VILLAGE IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE (BINH GIA), REFUGEE CATHOLICS VOTED 95 PERCENT FOR THIEU AND KY.

5. NO SINGLE EXPLANINATION ACCOUNTS FOR REMARKABLE DZU SHOWING IN III COPRS. ALMOST WITHOUT EXCEPTION, DZU DID BEST IN AREAS WHERE WAR IS FIERCEST AND WHERE AT SAME TIME VIET CONG INFLUENCE OVER POPULATION GREATEST. ALTHOUGH RUMORS CONTINUE TO CIRCULATE THAT STRONG DZU SHOWING IN THESE ARSEAS WAS DUE TO DELIBERATE ASSISTANCE FROM VIET CONG, THIS HAS YET TO BE PROVEN. IN FACT, ALTHOUGHIN ISOLATED INSTANCES LOCAL VC ELEMENTS MAY HAVE INSTRUCTED THE PEOPLE THAT IT THEY MUST VOTE THEY SHOULD VOTE FOR DZU, INITIAL INTELLIGENCE REPORTS INDICATE THAT THIS DOES NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN A CONCERTED STRATEGEM.

6. OF VARIOUS REASONS TO WHICH DZU SUCCESS ATTRIBUTABLE, MOST IMPORTANT IS HISVROGRAM, PARTICULARLY ITS SIMPLISTIC PEACE AND ANTI-DRAFT PLANKS. DZU MADE MOST EFFECTIVE USE

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OF "PEACE" APPEAL AND ANTI-GVN ATTACKS: RURAL PEOPLE OVER WHOM WAR IS RAGING DO NOT CARE MUCH WHETHER THE "PEACE" DZU WAS PROMISING WAS TO BE A "PEACE WITH HONOR" OR A "PEACE WITH FREEDOM." THEY WERE MOREINTERESTED IN "PEACE NOW," AND THIS NO DOUBT ALSO APPEALED TO MANY VC CADRE, SOME OF WHOM MAY HAVE ENCOURAGED PEOPLE TO CAST DZU BALLOTS. DURING INTENSE ANTI-ELECTION CAMPAIGN, VC VIRTUALLY IGNORED

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DZU, CONCENTRATING THEIR FIRE ON THIEU, AND SECONDARILY ON HUVG AND SUU, AS "AMERICAN LACKEYS." THUS WHEN IT CAME TIME FOR LOCAL CADRE TO DETERMINE LAST MINUTE ANTI-ELECTION STRATEGY, IT MAY HAVE APPEARED LOGICAL AND PROPER TO SOME TO PASS THE WORD TO VOTE FOR DZU, ESPECIALLY AS MANY LOCAL CADRE MAY HAVE BEEN GENUINELY ATTRACTED BY DZU'S PLATFORM JUST AS WERE THEIR NEIGHBORS AND FOR THE SAME RREASONS. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO DZU'S SUCCESS IS UNDOUBTEDLY TAN DAI VIET ORGANIZATION, STRENGTH OF WHICH HAS BEEN HARD TO ASSESS DUE TO ITS CLANDESTINE ORGANIZATION BUT WHICH HAS CERTAINLY EMERGED AS STRONG FACTOR IN III CORPS AREAS SURROUNDING SAIGON.

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ACTION EA 19

INFO NSCE 00,CIAE 00,SSO 00,DODE 00,USIE 00,NSAE 00,SP 02,SS 35,
GPM 03,SC 01,NSC 10,RSC 01,P 04,INR 07,SAH 03,SAL 01,AID 30,H 02,
L 03,RSR 01,/122 W

P R 111150Z SEP 67
FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6604
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 4206
CINCPAC
AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE 2498
AMCONSUL DANANG 942

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7. ALSO INTERSTING TO SPECULATE ON DEGREE TO WHICH DZU SHOWING SATTRIBUTABLE TO EFFECT OF COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA. AFTER DIEM'S OVERTHROW IT TOOK A MONTH OR MORE FOR NEWS TO REACH RURAL POPULATION. WE HAVE REPORTS THAT DURING CAMPAIGN FOR DAYS AFTER A PUBLIC APPEARANCE OVER TELEVISION OR RADIO THE CANDIDATES' SPEECHES WEE BEING DISCUSSED IN THE VILLAGES. INSOFAR AS DZU MADE MOST EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION IN PUBLIC, THIS UNDOUBTEDLY WORKED TO HIS ADVANTAGE.

8. MOST PREVALENT AMONG THE RUMORS CIRCULATING IN III CORPS AS TO REASON FOR DZU SHOWING IS ALLEGED VC SUPPORT, DIS-

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CUSSED ABOVE. OTHER RUMORS ARE THAT DZU WAS MASSIVELY BACKED BY "AMERICAN DOVES." FEW SEEM TO BELIEVE THAT GVN IN MACHIAVELLIAN MACHINATION THREW HUONG VOTES TO DZU, A RUMOR

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WHICH IS HEARD ELSEWHERE ESPECIALLY IN THE DELTA. RATHER, GVN OFFICIALS HAVE EVIDENCED SOME CONCERN OVER WHETHER RAGIME WILL HOLD THEM RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIVELY POOR THIEU-KY SHOWING VIS-A-VIS DZU. NERVOUSNESS ESPECIALLY EVIDENT IN BINH PROVINCE CHIEF. ALSO INDICATION THAT GVN DID NOT DELIBERATELY SUPPORT DZU IS PROVIDED BY CASE OF LONG AN DEPUTY FOR SECURITY, WHO AS KNOWN MEMBER OF TAN DAI VIET AND DZU SUPPORTER WAS DISMISSED FROM HIS POST IN WEEK BEFORE ELECTION ALLEGEDLY FOR BACKING DZU TOO OPENLY.

9. LACKING APPLICATION POLLING TECHNIQUES WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE AS TO MOTIVATION OF URBAN VOTER. IT IS CLEAR THAT BETTER-INFORMED AND PRESUMABLY MORE SOPHISTICATED URBAN DWELLERS WERE MUCH LESS TAKEN BY DZU THAN RURAL PEASANT. TOWNSMAN PO KIBLY FOUND DZU'S STOP-THE-WAR APPEAL LESS TO HIS LIKING; THE WAR IS HURTING HIM LESS THAN HIS RURAL COMPATRIOT -- THERE IS ENOUGH WORK AND CONSUMER GOODS ARE PLENTIFUL. THE COST OF LIVING IS TOWNSMAN'S PRIMARY CONCERN,

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AND HE PORBABLY ASSOCIATES -- QUITE PROPERLY -- INSTABILITY WITH INFLATION. IF NOT ENTIRELY HAPPY WITH THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT, URBAN VOTER OBVIOUSLY CHOSE HUONG OR SUU IN PREFERENCE TO DZU, IF HE WANTED TO PLAY IT SAFE AND OPT FOR MORE OF THE SAME, THIEU COLLECTED HIS VOTE.

10. QUESTIN OF FRAUD, UPPERMOST IN MINDS OF ELECTORATE BEFORE ELECTION, APPEARS TO HAVE DIMINISHED AS A MAJOR TOPIC OF CONVERSATION IN MOST AREAS. IN ELEVENT OF 12 III CORPS ELECTORAL JURISDICTIONS AMERICANS ON THE SCENE REPORT THAT THE VOTING APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN WELL-ORGANIZED AND FAIRLY CONDUCTED, WITH NO INDICATIONS OF SIGNIFICANT IRREGULARITIES. POPULOUS GIA DINH IS THE EXCEPTION, WHERE TIEU VICTORY GREATER THAN CAN BE READILY EXPLAINED, ESPECIALLY IN BINH CHANH DISTRICT. THERE IS NO FIRM EVIDENCE OF FRAUD AS YET, BUT THE CUMULATIVE INDICATIONS ARE EXTENSIVE, AND INCLUDE SIGNS OF DOUBLE VTING BY SOME ARVN SOLDIERS, ON IFSTRUCTIONS; FALSIFICATION OF RETURNS IN BINH CHANH DISTRICT, AND MANIPULATION OF VOTERS' CARDS TO WITHHOLD CERTAIN NUMBER WHICH WERE THAN "VOTED" AT OPPORTUNE TIME FOR THIEU. BUNKER

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